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The paper explores the rhetorical potential of modal adverbs and it brings an 
interactional dimension to the study of legal genres. In agreement with Traugott 
(2010), it follows the view that “very little language use is purely monologic” and 
that speakers and writers frequently position themselves towards alternative 
viewpoints, contesting or refuting counterarguments and expressing doubt. To this 
end, based on data from adversarial proceedings, US Supreme Court oral 
arguments and written opinions as well as Opinions of the Advocates General at 
the European Court of Justice, the study examines the functional spectrum of 
modal adverbs distinguished by Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007). As 
revealed by the analysis, the interpersonal meanings conveyed by the adverbs 
found in the corpus include politeness and solidarity, on the one hand, and power 
and authority, on the other. 
 
Keywords: epistemic stance, heteroglossia, legal discourse, legal genres, modal 
adverbs, power relations 
 
1. Introduction 
The dialogic orientation of any discourse was duly noted already by Bakhtin (1981), 
introducing the notion of heteroglossia in the context of literary genres. Similar voices can 
also be found in the linguistics literature, with scholars claiming that “very little language use 
is purely monologic” (Traugott 2010: 15) or that the expression of speakers’ attitudes is 
“pervasive in all uses of language” (Stubbs 1996: 202). Likewise, in this paper I demonstrate 
that legal discourse reveals the influence of alternative viewpoints and that as such, it can be 
approached as dialogic, regardless of whether it is spoken or written. Towards this end, I 
explore the recruitment of modal adverbs of certainty in the legal setting, focusing, in 
particular, on their potential to negotiate personal stances and to foreground and background 
competing arguments. In the analysis, I draw on the dynamic approach to modal adverbs 
proposed by Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007), stressing the role of these adverbs in 
co-constructing interpersonal meanings, rather than merely expressing varying degrees of 
certainty and doubt.  
 
2. Research focus, methodology and data 
As stated above, this paper sets out to examine the interactional potential of modal adverbs of 
certainty, with the aim of establishing the most frequent co-occurrence patterns as well as 
discourse-pragmatic functions of the adverbs under scrutiny. More specifically, the study 
focuses on the choice and distribution of modal adverbs across selected legal genres, both 
spoken and written, with a view to demonstrating how their use reflects power relations as 
well as the type of social activity and the social roles of the discourse participants. It also 
offers a closer look at the functional spectrum of the items analysed, hoping to reveal 
pragmatic meanings which are salient in the legal setting. 
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In examining the deployment of the adverbs in the data, I follow Simon-Vandenbergen 
and Aijmer’s (2007) treatment of modal adverbs of certainty. Thus, in line with the linguists’ 
dynamic approach to modal adverbs, I adopt the assumption that these adverbs are interactive 
devices which are used predominantly to convey stance and that they should therefore be 
interpreted in the context of other utterances, whether prior or anticipated (i.e. real or 
imagined). Along the same lines, applying the notion of Bakhtinian heteroglossia, I subscribe 
to the view that all utterances are dialogised, that is that they interact with one another as well 
as with other opinions, points of view or value judgments (Bakhtin 1981: 279).  
For this study, I have compiled a 2,265,000-word corpus composed of four 
subcorpora, i.e.: 
 Transcripts from 32 days of court proceedings in the Irving v. Lipstadt trial (app. 1.5m 
words); 
 Transcripts from 30 oral arguments heard by the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America (app. 405,000 words); 
 30 dissenting opinions written by the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America (app. 120,000 words); 
 30 Opinions of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice (app. 240,000 
words).  
To balance spoken and written data, the first two subcorpora comprise spoken genres, 
whereas the latter two represent written legal discourse. It should also be noted that the Irving 
v. Lipstadt trial data exemplify adversarial (accusatorial) proceedings, during which the 
parties’ main goal is to furnish evidence in support of their position and, ultimately, to affect 
the judge’s perception of the case. In order to do so, they resort to coercive questioning in an 
attempt to discredit, or even ridicule, the testimony provided by the opposing party. Oral 
arguments, on the other hand, are delivered by attorneys, who have 30 minutes each to argue 
their case before the Supreme Court of the United States of America, and they can be 
interrupted by questions from the justices. Though it is not always the case, discussions 
during oral arguments can also change the justices’ final ruling. As for the written genres, I 
have selected dissenting opinions written by the justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States of America, since they are written by individual justices and as such, they contain 
numerous stance markers, with modal adverbs being no exception. Similarly, opinions written 
by the Advocates General and intended to convincingly justify the Court’s decision were 
chosen due to their persuasive potential.1 
As for the method used, at the outset of the investigation, the most frequent modal 
adverbs of certainty in each subcategory were identified in the respective subcorpora. Though 
acknowledging the fact that functions can overlap and that therefore no categorization can 
ever be absolute, for the purposes of the study I adopted, after Simon-Vandenbergen and 
Aijmer (2007), the rough division into epistemic, evidential, expectation and speech act 
adverbs and so during the analysis the adverbs were grouped accordingly. It should also be 
mentioned that the frequency count was a starting point for the qualitatively oriented reading 
of the data and that its main goal was to identify items worth looking at in greater detail 
during the subsequent stage of the study. 
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3. Findings 
3.1 Frequency of modal adverbs in spoken and written genres 
As suggested above, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, the study has 
revealed interesting correlations between the choice of adverbs and selected legal genres. 
Accordingly, Table 1 shows the most frequent modal adverbs in each subcategory (epistemic, 
evidential, expectation and speech act).2 For reasons of space, other modal adverbs, though 
also attested by the data, have been excluded from the analysis. To ensure consistency and 
comparability, and given the varied sizes of the subcorpora, the raw scores have been 
normalised to reflect the number of occurrences per million words. 
 
 
Table 1 Frequency of modal adverbs in selected legal genres 
 
As corroborated by the data, both in spoken and written genres, the category of epistemic 
adverbs proved to be the most visible, with a remarkably low frequency of speech act adverbs 
in all the contexts analysed. With regard to individual adverbs, of course (with 1133.01 
occurrences per million words) was by far the most common item in the spoken genres, while 
indeed (attested by as many as 933.33 occurrences per million words) emerged as the 
preferred choice in the written genres. On the other hand, predictably, the incidence of of 
course in written text was low, just as was the frequency of indeed in spoken data. Further, 
certainly ranked as the second most common adverb (821.70 attestations per million words) 
in the spoken data, followed by clearly (466.16 tokens) and obviously (406.91 tokens). As for 
 SPOKEN GENRES  WRITTEN GENRES  
 
Adversarial 
proceedings 
Oral  
Arguments 
 Dissenting 
opinions 
Opinions of 
Advocates 
General 
 
 
 
Raw (Normalised) 
 
Raw (Normalised) 
 
Spoken 
Total 
(Normalised) 
 
Raw (Normalised) 
 
 
Raw (Normalised) 
 
Written  
Total 
(Normalised) 
 
Epistemic       
certainly 677 (451.33) 150 (370.37) (821.70) 20 (166.66) 6 (25) (191,66) 
no doubt 200 (133.33) 5 (12.34) (145.67) 3 (25) 6 (25) (50) 
indeed 495 (330) 28 (69.13) (399.13) 54 (450) 116 (483.33) (933.33) 
Evidential       
obviously 440 (293.33) 46 (113.58) (406.91) 6 (50) 11 (45.83) (95.83) 
clearly 443 (295.33) 70 (170.83) (466.16) 29 (241.66) 54 (225) (466.66) 
plainly 45 (30) 4 (9.87) (39.87) 7 (58.33) 5 (20.83) (79.16) 
Expectation       
of course 1254 (836) 113 (279.01) (1133.01) 30 (250) 11 (45.83) (295.83) 
necessarily 38 (25.33) 19 (46.91) (72.24) 21 (175) 12 (50) (225) 
not necessarily 103 (68.66) 23 (56.79) (125.45) 9 (75) 11 (45.83) (120.83) 
Speech act       
admittedly 23 (15.33) 2 (4.93) (20.26) 0 (0) 6 (25) (25) 
arguably 4 (2.66) 12 (29.62) (32,28) 1 (8.33) 7 (29.16) (37.49) 
unquestionably 5 (3.33) 5 (12.34) (15.67) 1 (8.33) 2 (8.33) (16.66) 
TOTAL   (3,709.28)   (2,554.11) 
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the written subcorpus, apart from the most common indeed, which plainly outnumbered all 
the other adverbs, clearly (466.66 tokens) and of course (295.83 tokens) resurfaced as 
relatively frequent choices too. Somewhat surprisingly, in the case of clearly, the normalized 
frequencies in the spoken and written genres were almost identical, even though previous 
research suggests that this adverb is more frequent in spoken interactions than in written 
genres (cf. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007: 201-202). 
To provide a broader picture and to put the findings in perspective, Tables 2 and 3 
below juxtapose the relative frequencies of selected modal adverbs in legal and non-legal 
spoken and written genres, respectively. While, obviously, no generalisations can be made at 
this point, certain trends can be observed and interpretations attempted. Firstly, it can be 
noticed that of course, which is by far the most frequent adverb in the data, is preferred in 
highly competitive and argumentative contexts such as adversarial proceedings (836 tokens) 
or parliamentary debates (1100 tokens). However, since no contextual data are provided, it is 
not possible to determine whether the adverb is used predominantly to convey solidarity or to 
signal superiority (cf. Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below). On the other hand, in the case of social 
letters, where of course is also quite frequent (667 tokens), we may speculate that this adverb 
is, in all probability, solidarity-oriented and that as such, it is used to create familiarity rather 
than to increase the distance between the writer and the recipient.3 Frequent in parliamentary 
discourse (850 tokens), indeed, in turn, emerges as an important element of academic writing 
(600 tokens) too, where, somewhat unexpectedly, it is more common than in different types 
of legal writing (with 450 and 483.33 attestations, respectively). Finally, also worthy of note 
is the distribution of clearly, which, as the data suggest, is at least twice as frequent in spoken 
and written legal genres as it is in non-legal settings, where it is used relatively infrequently. 
Thus, the usage of this adverb might be described as typical of legalese. 
 
 
SPOKEN  
LEGAL GENRES 
SPOKEN 
NON-LEGAL GENRES 
 
 
Adversarial 
proceedings 
Oral 
arguments 
Parliamentary 
debates 
Direct 
conversations 
Unscripted 
speeches 
 per million words per million words per million words 
 
per million words 
 
per million words 
 
certainly 451.33 370.37 50 350 333 
no doubt 133.33 12.34 250 22 83 
indeed 330 69.13 850 61 233 
obviously 293.33 113.58 250 428 467 
clearly 295.33 170.83 150 6 150 
of course 836 279.01 1100 422 108 
 
Table 2 Frequency of selected modal adverbs in spoken genres4 
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WRITTEN  
LEGAL GENRES 
WRITTEN  
NON-LEGAL GENRES 
 
 
Dissenting 
opinions 
Opinions of 
Advocates 
General 
Humanities 
academic 
writing 
Social letters Business 
letters 
 per million words per million words per million words 
 
per million words 
 
per million words 
 
certainly 166.66 25 100 67 133 
no doubt 25 25 150 233 133 
indeed 450 483.33 600 67 167 
obviously 50 45.83 -- 167 33 
clearly 241.66 225 100 67 33 
of course 250 45.83 450 667 450 
 
Table 3 Frequency of selected modal adverbs in written genres5 
 
3.2 Interpersonal functions of modal adverbs in legal genres 
 
Having looked at the frequencies of selected modal adverbs across various genres and 
contexts, in the remainder of the article I will turn my attention to the interpersonal functions 
of these adverbs, described, accordingly, as: (1) politeness and solidarity and (2) power and 
authority.  
 
3.2.1 Politeness and solidarity 
Besides signalling various degrees of certainty and doubt, modal adverbs index politeness and 
solidarity too. As borne out by the present set of data, they play a role in creating a sense of 
togetherness also in the legal context, even though in this setting it seems less obvious (or 
expected) than their role in asserting power and authority. 
 To start with, a noteworthy pattern recognised in the data was that involving the 
adverbs indeed, of course, and, to a lesser extent, certainly and obviously.  More often than 
not, the first two of them appeared in sequences of moves produced by speakers or writers to 
balance the arguments, i.e. to background opposing viewpoints and to foreground their own 
propositions. Thus, stressing their partial agreement or solidarity with the opponent, the 
arguers realised tripartite Concessive schemata in the sense of Couper-Kuhlen and Thompson 
(2000) and Barth-Weingarten (2003), including cardinal or reversed combinations of claims, 
acknowledgments (often co-occurring with indeed or of course) and counterclaims (typically 
signalled with contrastive markers such as but or however).  
That said, the examples in (1), (2) and (3) below illustrate the ways in which the 
adverbs are used for alignment and for stressing common ground with the recipient, rather 
than for disalignment with opposing arguments. Accordingly, representing the claim- 
acknowledgment-counterclaim pattern in written data, (1) can be interpreted as an attempt to 
make a minor concession (while it does indeed interfere with that right)6 in order to pave the 
way for the General Advocate’s preferred argument (strengthened with the authority-oriented 
statement is in my view clearly permitted) that the German court’s interference was in certain 
circumstances justified.  
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(1)  [X] First, Fujitsu and Hewlett Packard argue that the Bundesgerichtshof’s 
interpretation interferes with the right to property guaranteed by Article 17 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, (61) in that it prevents rightholders from 
granting free licences to copy their works.  
[X'] However, while it does indeed interfere with that right,  
[Y] such interference is in my view clearly permitted by the second sentence of 
Article 17(1) of the Charter, in so far as it is ‘in the public interest and in the 
cases and under the conditions provided for by law’ and fair compensation is 
paid. [W_O_6] 
 
Similarly to indeed above, in (2), illustrating the reversed counterclaim- acknowledgment-
return to the counterclaim pattern in written material, of course is recruited to acknowledge 
the justifiability of an alternative legal interpretation (though, of course, the former 
interpretation is subsumed within the latter). In this instance, however, the acknowledgment 
is postposed, i.e. it comes after the writer’s preferred argument (I reached the view that ....) 
introduced at the beginning of the argumentative sequence. What is more, in this case, of 
course is used in the acknowledgment (X') which is not the main point that the arguer is 
trying to make. Instead, the strategy is meant to introduce a reply to an alternative (or 
opposing) standpoint, which, though not expressly stated, is built into the argumentation,7 
while the main weight of the argument lies in the counterclaim. In this way, of course 
operates as an “authoritative backgrounding device” used to play down an alternative 
standpoint (cf. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007: 221). 
 
(2) [Y-] In my Opinion in Bolbol (at points 77 to 84 and 100 to 102), I reached the 
view that the latter interpretation was correct, and I am still of that view  
[X'] – though, of course, the former interpretation is subsumed within the latter,  
[-Y] which will include any event rendering UNRWA incapable of providing 
assistance. [W_O_12] 
  
In (3), in turn, extracted from the spoken portion of the corpus, the typical Yes, but schema is 
signalled with certainly in the acknowledgment and the contrastive but in the rebuttal. In this 
instance, arguing his case before Supreme Court justices, the attorney responds to the justice’s 
proposition that same-sex parents should enjoy full recognition and full status. He begins his 
argument saying politely: Your Honor, I certainly would not dispute the importance of that 
consideration only to continue with a rebuttal to the effect that in the context of the matter in 
hand there simply is no data. Thus, mitigating the possible negative effect that his 
disagreement might have, the attorney engages in a polite dialogue with the justice, while 
managing to advance his preferred argument which differs from that put forward by his 
interlocutor. 
 
(3)  [X] JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I think there’s – there’s substantial -- that there’s 
substance to the point that sociological information is new. We have five years 
of information to weigh against 2,000 years of history or more. On the other 
hand, there is an immediate legal injury or legal -- what could be a legal injury, 
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and that's the voice of these children. There are some 40,000 children in 
California, according to the Red Brief, that live with same-sex parents, and they 
want their parents to have full recognition and full status. The voice of those 
children is important in this case, don’t you think? 
[X'] MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I certainly would not dispute the importance 
of that consideration. That consideration especially in the political process 
where this issue is being debated and will continue to be debated, certainly, in 
California. It’s being debated elsewhere.  
[Y] But on that -- on that specific question, Your Honor, there -- there simply is 
no data. [S_OA_18] 
 
Apart from the cases of indeed, of course and certainly discussed above, obviously and 
evidently also swam into view during the analysis. Although the two adverbs literally mark 
the source of certainty and evidence, they have also developed the meanings of ‘apparently’ 
and ‘as evidence seems to suggest’, as duly noted by Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 
316). For instance in (4), obviously, which was far more frequent than evidently, operates as a 
mitigator, lessening the forcefulness of the claim advanced by the arguer, otherwise 
strengthened by the repeated use of certainly.  
 
(4) MS. KAPLAN: That would be certainly a different case. It’d be more similar to 
the case I think you heard yesterday than the case that we have today. We 
certainly believe that sexual-orientation discrimination should get heightened 
scrutiny. If it doesn’t get heightened scrutiny, obviously, it’d be rational basis, 
and the question would be what the State interests were in not allowing couples, 
for example, in North Carolina who are gay to get married. [S_OA_23] 
 
The adverb evidently, on the other hand, which might well be expected among the most 
frequent modal adverbs in judicial reasoning based on logic and tangible evidence, was used 
rather infrequently.8 This seems to corroborate the assertion that the adverb is being used to 
convey a lesser degree of certainty and tentativeness rather than to refer to solid evidence, as 
illustrated by an excerpt from the closing statement of the claimant in (5). 
 
(5)  The Goebbels diary is sometimes a very deceitful  document; it must be 
recognized as such and treated very gingerly indeed. It is the diary of a liar, a  
propagandist. The fact that it was evidently written up not one, but two or even 
three days later, after the  Kristallnacht episode, calls for additional caution in  
relying on it for chronology and content. [S_Ad_Day_10] 
 
So, on the whole, it can be concluded that modal adverbs function as markers of alignment 
and solidarity, intended to acknowledge the opponent’s arguments instead of bluntly 
discarding them, on the one hand, and as “precursors of disagreement,” enabling an analyst to 
predict the occurrence of a counterclaim, on the other.  
 
3.2.2 Power and authority 
As shown in the preceding sections of the article, modal adverbs serve to mark solidarity and 
politeness; however, since they are polysemous, they can be employed to signal power and 
superiority too. Seen from this perspective, (6) and (7) illustrate how of course, shown to play 
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a role in stressing familiarity in (2), can be useful in asserting superiority. Here, in the context 
of an antagonistic and competitive cross-examination, the claimant condescendingly questions 
the figures related to the quantity of Zyklon-B used in the Auschwitz concentration camp. The 
mocking effect of of course is strengthened by the combination with question tags that clearly 
point to the speaker’s intention to claim superior knowledge and to challenge the credibility of 
the witness and their testimony (you have, of course, read, have you not ….?; if you had 
assumed three, of course, you would have come …., would you not?). Unlike the Concessive 
use of of course in (2) stressing solidarity with the addressee, of course as it stands in (6) and 
(7), conversely, has a “put-down” effect,9 with the speaker claiming authority and undisputed 
knowledge.  
 
(6)  MR IRVING: My first question is you have, of course, read,  have you not, the 
testimony and supporting evidence in the trial of Bruno Tesch whose company 
was the main distributor East of the Elf for Zyklon-B  [S_Ad_Day_10] 
 
(7)  A. [Professor Robert Jan van Pelt] Nine tonnes can be justified, but it is a very 
high number because I am assuming two complete delousings of the camp,  
of all the buildings in the camp, per year.  
Q. [Mr Irving] If you had assumed three, of course, you would have come  
over 12 tonnes, would you not? [S_Ad_Day_10] 
 
Just as of course in the examples cited above, the adverb certainly can be used to mark power 
and superiority as well. The example in (8), for instance, shows how Justice Scalia, trying not 
to make absolute assessments with regard to same-sex marriage, firmly states that it is 
certainly true that -- that there’s no scientific answer to that question at this point in time. 
Clearly, in the sentence analysed, certainly is meant to underscore the justice’s authority, thus 
increasing the pragmatic force of his argument. 
 
(8)  JUSTICE SCALIA: I -- it’s true, but irrelevant. They’re arguing for a nationwide 
rule which applies to States other than California, that every State must allow 
marriage by same-sex couples. And so even though States that believe it is 
harmful -- and I take no position on whether it’s harmful or not, but it is 
certainly true that -- that there’s no scientific answer to that question at this 
point in time. [S_OA_18] 
 
By the same token, the A and indeed B pattern displayed in (9), adds more emphasis and 
conveys authority. It is also worthwhile pointing out that similarly to political discourse, the 
and indeed sequence is employed to enhance the rhetorical effect of the argument in the 
context of legal genres too. To achieve this goal, a less forceful assertion taxable persons 
were entitled … to allocate capital goods is followed not only by the emphatic indeed, but 
also by the stronger claim that they were required  to allocate capital goods. 
 
(9)  I would point out, however, that the main proceedings concern the acquisition 
and installation of solar panels in 2005, at which time taxable persons were 
entitled (and indeed required) to allocate capital goods as between the private 
and business spheres. [W_O_1] 
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Finally, in the following two excerpts, conviction and authority are successfully conveyed 
thanks to the adverbs clearly and necessarily. As can be seen, sentence-initial clearly in (10) 
stresses the status of the writer and the validity of their argument, whereas necessarily in (11) 
underlines external circumstances and the “expectedness” of a certain state of affairs, that is, 
in this context, the need to base one’s argument on specific legal rules and instruments. 
 
(10)  Clearly, to the extent that he acts as a taxable person, Mr Fuchs is subject to all 
the rules of EU and national law which govern the rights and obligations of 
taxable persons. [W_O_1] 
 
(11)  Such an assessment is necessarily based on the rules contained in Title II of 
Regulation No 1408/71 which concern the determination of the legislation 
applicable. [W_O_21] 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
My goal in this paper has been to demonstrate that modal adverbs of certainty perform a 
number of interpersonal functions, with politeness and solidarity at one end of the spectrum 
(e.g. note the use of of course or certainly) and power and authority, at the other (e.g. note the 
use of indeed or clearly). As has been shown, it is thorough the use of modal adverbs that 
legal discourse participants, in a bid to play down alternative standpoints, make their voices 
sound more resoundingly and enact their social roles, be it that of attorney, claimant or 
justice. In consequence, legal communication bears traces of alternative voices, real or 
anticipated, which are built into it, successfully increasing the rhetorical effect of 
counterarguments. Still, I do not claim here that the interactional approach is the only angle 
from which to explore the role of modal adverbs in legal genres. What I have been trying to 
show, however, is that they contribute to a great extent to the dialogic nature of legal 
discourse, regardless of whether it is represented by highly antagonistic and dynamic 
courtroom interaction or carefully edited briefs and opinions drafted by skilful attorneys or 
erudite jurists. 
 
Notes 
 
1 An interesting discussion on the persuasive strategies employed by the Advocates General in the 
Opinions can be found in Salmi-Tolonen (2005).   
 
2 It should be clarified at this point that the adverbs which are most frequent in the respective 
categories are not necessarily the most frequent ones in the total count. 
 
3 As Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 210) rightly point out, social letters resemble spoken 
dialogue and are therefore more likely to have the same solidarity-oriented strategies as spoken 
genres. 
 
4 I quote reference data on the frequency of selected modal adverbs in spoken genres after Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 201-202). 
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5 I quote reference data on the frequency of selected modal adverbs in written genres after Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 202). 
 
6 In the acknowledging move, indeed frequently co-occurs with the emphatic do (cf. Szczyrbak 2014). 
 
7 Remarkably, the greatest accumulation of evidently was found in the transcript from the last day of 
the libel trial, documenting the closing statements of the litigant parties, unlike the cross-examination 
data, where the adverb was used rather sparingly. 
 
8 Cf. Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (2007: 209). 
 
9 The “put-down” effect of of course has been discussed in Simon-Vandenbergen, White and Aijmer 
(2007). 
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10. Dissenting opinion (ALITO, S.) in case no. 12-71 
11. Dissenting opinion (BREYER, S.) in case no. 11-770 
12. Dissenting opinion (SOTOMAYOR, S.) in case no. 11-820 
13. Dissenting opinion (ROBERTS, J.) in cases no. 11-1545 and 11-1547 
14. Dissenting opinion (BREYER, S.) in case no. 11-1025 
15. Dissenting opinion (GINSBURG, R. and BREYER, S.) in case no. 11-864 
16. Dissenting opinion (ALITO, S.) in case no. 11-9540 
17. Dissenting opinion (ALITO, S.) in case no. 11-1327 
18. Dissenting opinion (GINSBURG, R.) in case no. 11-345 
19. Dissenting opinion (ALITO, S.) in case no. 11-564 
20. Dissenting opinion (ROBERTS, J.) in case no. 12-416 
21. Dissenting opinion (KAGAN, E.) in case no. 11-1059 
22. Dissenting opinion (SCALIA, A.) in case no. 11-9307 
23. Dissenting opinion (KENNEDY, A.) in case no. 12-144 
24. Dissenting opinion (GINSBURG, R.) in case no. 11-697 
25. Dissenting opinion (KAGAN, E.) in case no. 11-1447 
26. Dissenting opinion (SOTOMAYOR, S.) in case no. 11-626 
27. Dissenting opinion (GINSBURG, R.) in case no. 12-25 
28. Dissenting opinion (SOTOMAYOR, S.) in case no. 11-1175 
29. Dissenting opinion (SCALIA, A.) in case no. 12-207 
30. Dissenting opinion (SCALIA, A.) in case no. 12-418 
 
“Irving v. Lipstadt: Transcripts.” 2000. Holocaust Denial on Trial: Using History to Confront 
Distortions. Emory University. Available at: http://www.hdot.org/en/trial/transcripts/index.html.  
 
Opinions of Advocates General at the European Court of Justice. Available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/.  
 
1. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-461/11 
2. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-379/11 
3. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-364/11 
4. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-363/11 
5. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-299/11  
6. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered in case no. C-207/11 
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7. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-179/11 
8. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-174/11 
9. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-160/11 
10. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-152/11 
11. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-149/11 
12. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered in case no. C-138/11 
13. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-137/11 
14. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered in case no. C-136/11 
15. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-131/11 
16. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-115/11  
17. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-112/11 
18. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-79/11 
19. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in cases no. C-55/11, C-57/11, C-58/11  
20. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-44/11 
21. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered in case no. C-35/11 
22. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen delivered in case no. C-5/11 
23. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in cases no. C-621/10, C-129/11  
24. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in cases no. C-611/10, C-612/10 
25. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered in case no. C-564/10 
26. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in cases no. C-553/10 P, C-554/10 P  
27. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-551/10 P 
28. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-549/10 P 
29. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-544/10 
30. Opinion of Advocate General Mazak delivered in case no. C-534/10 P  
 
Oral arguments delivered at the Supreme Court of the United States of America. Available at: 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcript.  
 
1. Oral argument delivered in case no. 11-796 
2. Oral argument delivered in case no. 11-798 
3. Oral argument delivered in case no. 11-889 
4. Oral argument delivered in case no. 11-1221 
5. Oral argument delivered in case no. 11-1518 
6. Oral argument delivered in case no. 11-10189 
7. Oral argument delivered in case no. 11-10362 
8. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-10 
9. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-17 
10. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-43 
11. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-52 
12. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-62 
13. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-71 
14. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-123 
15. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-126 
16. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-135 
17. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-142 
18. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-144 
19. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-167 
20. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-207 
21. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-236 
22. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-246 
23. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-307 
24. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-357 
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25. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-398 
26. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-399 
27. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-416 
28. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-418 
29. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-484 
30. Oral argument delivered in case no. 12-547 
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